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Abstract. We investigate a new strategy which can defeat the (in)famous Carter's 
“anthropic” argument against extraterrestrial life and intelligence. In contrast to those 
already considered by Wilson, Livio, and others, the present approach is based on 
relaxing hidden uniformitarian assumptions, considering instead a dynamical succession 
of evolutionary regimes governed by both global (Galaxy-wide) and local (planet- or 
planetary system-limited) regulation mechanisms. This is in accordance with recent 
developments in both astrophysics and evolutionary biology. Notably, our increased 
understanding of the nature of supernovae and gamma-ray bursts, as well as of strong 
coupling between the Solar System and the Galaxy on one hand, and the theories of 
“punctuated equilibria” of Eldredge and Gould and “macroevolutionary regimes” of 
Jablonski, Valentine, et al. on the other, are in full accordance with the regulation-
mechanism picture. The application of this particular strategy highlights the limits of 
application of Carter's argument, and indicates that in the real universe its applicability 
conditions are not satisfied. We conclude that drawing far-reaching conclusions about the 
scarcity of extraterrestrial intelligence and the prospects of our efforts to detect it on the 
basis of this argument is unwarranted.  
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An unflinching determination to take the whole evidence into account is the 
only method of preservation against the fluctuating extremes of fashionable 
opinion. 
 
 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World  (1929), p. 268 
 
Thunderbolt steers all things. 
 
      Heraclitus of Ephesus, On Nature, fragment B64    
  
1. Introduction: Carter's argument 
 
The well-known argument against the existence of extraterrestrial intelligence 
(henceforth ETI) due to the astrophysicist Brandon Carter (1983), and developed 
by various authors (e.g., Barrow and Tipler 1986), goes as follows. If astrophysical 
(t*) and biological (tb) timescales are truly uncorrelated, life in general and 
intelligent life in particular forms at random epoch with respect to the 
characteristic timescale of its astrophysical environment (notably, the Main-
Sequence lifetime of the considered star). In the Solar system, t* ≈ tb, within the 
factor of two. However, in general, it should be either tb >> t* or tb ~ t*  or t* >> tb. 
The second case is much less probable a priori in light of the independent nature 
of these quantities. Carter dismisses the third option also, since in that case it is 
difficult to understand why the very first inhabited planetary system (that is, the 
Solar System) exhibits t* ≈ tb behaviour. On the contrary, we would then expect 
that life (and intelligence) arose on Earth, and probably at other places in the Solar 
System, much earlier than they in fact did. This gives us probabilistic reason to 
believe that tb >> t*  (in which case the observation selection effect explains very 
well why we do perceive the t* ≈ tb case in the Solar System). Thus, the 
extraterrestrial life and intelligence have to be very rare, which is the reason why 
we have not observed them so far, in spite of the conjecture that favorable 
conditions for them exist at many places throughout the Galaxy.1  
Carter's argument (henceforth CA) has been given much attention in the 
astrobiological and SETI-related discourses. It has been given very favorable 
assessment in the monograph of Barrow and Tipler (1986). Authors so diverse as 
Maddox (1984), Bostrom (2002), Barrow (2002), Lineweaver and Davis (2002, 
2003), Davies (2003), and Duric and Field (2003) hold CA in high regard. 
Astrobiologists McKay (1996) and Livio (1999) regard it as an all-important 
constraint on astrobiological theories (although Livio presents an empirical 
counter-argument, he does not challenge the validity of the reasoning behind it). 
SETI skeptics, like Tipler (1988, 2004) use it as an important part of argumentation 
for claiming that we are alone in the Galaxy. Lineweaver and Davis (2002, 2003) 
                                                 
1 Strictly speaking, this is just a half of Carter’s argument in his fascinating 1983. paper. The rest 
concerns the issue of the number of “crucial” (or “critical”) steps in emergence of intelligent 
observers on Earth and possibly elsewhere. Although later commentators, like Barrow and Tipler 
(1986) or Wilson (1994), devoted much attention to this “anthropic” prediction, it lies outside of 
the scope of the present paper. Without going into details, it is straightforward to see how 
undermining of the former argument leads to a substantial erosion of the claims of the latter. 
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mention CA approvingly, noticing that (i) it applies to noogenesis (origin of 
intelligence) rather than biogenesis (origin of life); and (ii) that any finding 
suggestive of long future duration of the biosphere will undermine it.  
However, it has also been criticized. Two most pertinent criticisms so far 
are those of Wilson (1994) and Livio (1999), the former mainly from the logico-
methodological and the latter from the physical point of view. We shall use 
elements of their criticisms here, but the bulk of the present remarks have not 
been presented in the literature so far. Wilson's criticism is mostly 
methodological; he argues that Carter is wrong in restricting the range of possible 
relations of tb and t* to the three cases listed above, as well as that on the face of 
the argument, the fact that we appeared on Earth significantly before the end of 
the Sun's Main Sequence lifetime is highly unlikely. In addition, Wilson points out 
that the role of the anthropic reasoning in CA is very minor, almost trivial. In 
several places, Wilson vaguely alludes to some of the empirical inadequacies of 
CA (see below), but refrains from investigate them further; in the next sections, 
we shall try to perform that task.   
The crucial assumption of CA is that there is no a priori reason for 
correlation between t* and tb. Livio (1999, 2005) has pointed out that this is the 
main weakness of this argument; processes which induce correlations between the 
two timescales, like the oxygenation of the atmosphere on terrestrial planets, 
undermine the argument. Notably, if stellar UV radiation prevents the 
appearance of land life due to high absorption by nucleic acids and proteins, than 
it is critical that sufficient ozone layer is built before land life appears. This, in 
turn, might induce a correlation between the astrophysical and biological 
timescales, since various stellar masses (and thus various lifetimes) will generate 
different amounts of UV radiation and dictate various rates of oxygenization of 
the atmospheres of hypothetical planets in their respective habitable zones. With 
the fall of this essential assumption of independence of two timescales, CA is 
doomed as well. 
We would like to hereby express even more radical criticism of Carter's 
argument, based on the questioning of its basic premisses, and to show that the 
reasoning behind it is inherently flawed—at least so without additional 
assumptions of rather questionable validity. The main idea is quite simple: 
Carter's argument relies on the assumption that there are fixed (or at least well-
defined) and roughly known timescales for at least astrophysical processes. In 
addition, it is assumed that the relevant biological timescale is well-defined, albeit 
unknown, as well. We reject these assumptions, and intend to show that there is 
sufficient physical justification to propose alternatives. These alternatives are 
more complicated than Carter's simplification, but this is the necessary price to 
pay to be in accordance with tremendous achievements of modern astrophysics 
and astrobiology during the last decade or so. (In addition, Carter requires that 
the relevant timescales are independent, but this was criticized by Livio and others, 
and is only a part of the present argument.) These alternatives encompass (i) 
external physical forcings acting on local biospheres all over the Galaxy, and (ii) 
elements of complex evolution, namely quasi-periodicity, stochasticity, change of 
macroevolutionary regimes, and secular evolution with cosmological time. In 
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other words, the core element of CA, belief that “the probability of intelligence 
increases monotonically with time” (Barrow and Tipler 1986; see §3 below) is (A) 
just a case of special pleading, and (B) is likely to be wrong on empirical grounds.  
In a very limited form, this central argument has been sketched in 
Dragićević and Ćirković (2003). As Einstein memorably used to say: “Everything 
should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.” [emphasis by the present 
authors] In particular, we believe that CA violates the second part of this 
important methodological guideline by failing to take into account timescale 
correlations induced by both secular evolution of the Galaxy and sudden 
catastrophic events; this stands in full accordance with Whitehead’s maxim 
quoted above, when applied to recent and current debates on SETI and related 
projects. In addition, it is a microcosm of several traditional issues in philosophy 
of science in general, and philosophy of biology in particular: issues of 
inevitability vs. contingence, gradualism vs. catastrophism, local vs. global 
influences on the biosphere, position of intelligent observers on the “tree of life”, 
and some others, recur in our study of CA and related topics.  
It is sometimes stated that CA offers an example of the scientific nature of 
the anthropic reasoning, by virtue of its falsifiability: it offers a prediction that our 
current astrobiological and SETI efforts will fail and that we shall not discover 
extraterrestrial intelligent beings in the Milky Way. Formally speaking, this does 
indeed make the hypothesis scientific, but it can be argued that in this case the 
meaning of falsifiability is stretched beyond its reasonable usage. For instance, the 
statement “There are no intelligent alien species in the Galaxy” presumes our 
capacity to always discriminate between intelligent and non-intelligent aliens with 
certainty, which can hardly be taken for granted (cf. Raup 1992; Lem 1976, 1987). 
Even if it were, the timescales for this kind of falsification are quite outstanding; 
in fact they are at least equal to the often-cited Fermi-Hart timescale for visiting (or 
colonizing) all stars in the Milky Way.2 Even the most ardent Popperian should 
pause when faced with such a remote prospect of falsification, especially when it 
is not necessary to doubt the anthropic reasoning itself in order to contest a 
specific argument using many auxiliary assumptions.  
 It is important to emphasize that we do not intend to make a case for the 
existence of ETIs in the Milky Way. That is a quite distinct (and, arguably, much 
more formidable) task. Our aim is simply to show how a particular anti-ETI 
argument—strengthened, unfortunately, by endless uncritical repetitions in both 
research and popular literature—can be undermined. Only insofar our lack of 
credence in the existence of Galactic ETIs is based on CA, it can be said that our 
study offers an indirect support for ETI plausibility. There are, however, other anti-
ETI arguments—notably the Tsiolkovsky-Fermi-Viewing-Hart-Tipler's argument, 
usually known simply as Fermi's paradox (for the best reviews see Brin 1983;  
Webb 2002)—which are beyond the scope of the present study and which could, 
                                                 
2 The qualification is necessary given our inability to decisively determine, for example, the degree 
of intelligence and consciousness of some of the species we share our planet with, namely marine 
mammals (e.g. Browne 2004). Since it is easier to make oneself known than to establish or refute 
intelligence on an alien planet with certainty, expected timescale can only be larger than the 
Fermi-Hart limit (cf. Ćirković and Bradbury 2006). 
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in principle, support ETI skepticism even if CA is dismantled. In our view, the 
entire problem of the existence or absence of extraterrestrial life and intelligence 
remains completely open.  
  
   
2. Are there well-defined timescales? 
 
There are many cases in everyday life, as well as in science, where apparently 
independent quantities are of similar or even the same order of magnitude. In an 
amusing example in his classic textbook Peebles (1993, p. 366) jovially notes the 
coincidence between the Eddington limit3 on luminosity of a star per unit mass, 
and Peebles’ own luminosity per unit mass. Although we are today vitually 
certain that the cosmic microwave background is of primordial origin, this does 
not invalidate the famous coincidence noted by Sir Fred Hoyle (1994; see also 
Lightman and Brawer 1992) that the quantity of helium in the universe is almost 
exactly such that its synthesis through the fusion of hydrogen in toto will produce 
about the same amount of energy as contained in CMB photons. The timescale for 
reading of this paper is of the same order of magnitude as the variability 
timescale of the ultraluminous X-ray source M74 X-1 (and, indeed, most of the 
microquasars in the local universe!). It would be preposterous and 
epistemologically naive to assume that in each instance of similar timescales, 
phenomena have to be causally linked. Such coincidences are so ubiquitous in our 
complex universe that entire pseudo-sciences have long ago arisen around some 
of them (measurements of the Great Pyramid of Egypt, for instance); they are 
reflection of humanity's psychological need for finding causal links and 
explanations even where all there is are, in G. Udny Yule's famous term, 
“nonsense correlations”. By far most of correlations in the world are of this, 
noncausal nature. In Peebles' words, “for practical purposes it is only an accident 
of essentially unrelated numbers.” 
But CA is an example of exactly the opposite extreme: denial of the 
possibility of such coincidences actually occuring, contrary to what both history of 
science and our everyday experiences tell us. According to Carter, even if they are 
observed to occur, as is allegedly the case in the Solar System, this must not reflect 
anything deeper than a consequence of our restricted viewpoint. Thus, Carter 
ignores some sound advice of Agatha Christie's famous Miss Marple of: “Any 
coincidence is always worth noticing... you can throw it away later if it is only a 
coincidence.” In effect, CA is spectacularly underestimating the vast complexity 
and intricacy of Nature. 
 Even if there is no causal link between tb and t*, it would be erroneous to 
reject the tb ~ t* case as Carter does. How many orders of magnitude does this 
region possess? Are there different external constraints on the timescales, 
                                                 
3 The Eddington limit is set by the balance of gravity and radiative pressure by stellar radiation in 
the star’s envelope (for a fine review, see Kippenhahn and Weigert 1994). If the envelope is to be 
bound by the star, the radiation pressure force has to be balanced by the gravity. Thus, the 
Eddington limit bounds the stellar luminosity and explains, among other things, why stars similar 
to the Sun but billion times brighter do not exist.   
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precluding them having values in the entire (0, +∞) range? This has also been 
criticized by Wilson (1994), though without appeal to physical reality, which 
makes the case against Carter's thesis significantly stronger. We shall argue now 
that, due to the oversimplification, there are additional timescales, which make tb 
~ t* the most interesting case. Then, it becomes an additional benefit that such 
choice would make the Earth truly unexceptional and thus is in good agreement 
with the Copernican principle.  
 Let us first redefine the astrophysical timescale t* as the timescale of 
continuous habitability of a terrestrial planet in the Milky Way galaxy. The 
difference may sound pedantic, but is in fact crucial when we recognize that 
(astro)physical processes other than the evolution of its parent star can influence the 
habitability of a planet. In particular, the need to abandon the “closed box” 
astrobiological picture of Earth (and terrestrial planets in general) is emphasized 
in a number of recent studies from different points of view. Most pertinently, 
Lineweaver et al. (2004) investigate the concept of the Galactic Habitable Zone 
(henceforth GHZ), introduced by Gonzalez et al. (2001), comprising the stars in 
the Milky Way potentially possessing habitable planets with complex life (for a 
fine review, see Gonzalez 2005).4 In both astrobiology and the Earth sciences, such 
paradigm shift toward an interconnected, complex view of our planet has already 
been present for quite some time in both empirical and theoretical work (e.g., 
Clube and Napier 1990; Cockell 1998; Burgess and Zuber 2000; Lenton and von 
Bloh 2001; Franck et al. 2000, 2001; Carslaw et al. 2002; Iyudin 2002; Gies and 
Helsel 2005; Chyba and Hand 2005). 
 (It is important to understand here that the very talk about habitable zones 
makes the assumptions of independent events at best suspicious. Habitable zones 
are defined as spatio-temporal regions where conditions for life arise due to 
correlated processes. As far as prospects for SETI are concerned, the relevant zone 
is GHZ, which occurs as a consequence of roughly understood processes of 
chemical and dynamical evolution of the Milky Way and its stellar populations. 
Even more telling in this respect is the concept of the Cosmic Habitable Age 
(CHA), introduced by Gonzalez (2005). Insofar as habitable zones are an 
unavoidable part of the modern astrobiological discourse, any argument based on 
the independent development of biospheres automatically looses force.)5 
 Before we analyze the particulars of these external influences and 
consequent timecale forcing, we wish to emphasize that the very idea of Carter 
that Main Sequence stellar lifetimes are the only relevant (astro)physical 
timescales is already a dangerous simplification. There are some rather 
uncontroversial—in contrast to some of the ideas considered below in more 
                                                 
4 As kindly pointed out to us by Prof. David Grinspoon, the first suggestion of anything even 
remotely similar to GHZ was given by the great author and philosopher Stanislaw Lem in his One 
Human Minute (Lem 1986). Lem obviously foreshadowed and inspired much of the contemporary 
research in astrobiology, including the present study (esp. Lem 1987).  
5 A minor additional argument to the same effect may come from the panspermia hypotheses 
which, although quite speculative and uncertain, have experienced recent resurgence. Thus, 
Napier (2004), as well as Wallis and Wickramasinghe (2004) have constructed working 
panspermia models in agreement with all known astrophysics. 
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detail—counterexamples in both past and future history of our planet.6 For 
instance, the “Snowball Earth” episodes occurring at least twice in the geological 
past (Kirschvink et al. 2000; Hoffman et al. 1998) represent global catastrophes 
which may have annihilated all life except for the small habitats around marine 
volcanoes and hydrothermal vents. It is entirely plausible that similar episodes of 
severe global glaciation could have annihilated all life at Earth-analogs elsewhere, 
so that the “astrobiological clock” gets a complete reset possibly even without any 
external causative agent, but due to an unfortunate combination of movement of 
continental plates and Milankovich cycles.7 Similarly, it seems clear that 
geophysical processes governing the carbon-silicate cycle are sustainable for a 
time shorter than the Main Sequence timescales in at least a fraction of potentially 
inhabitable terrestrial planets in the Milky Way (e.g., Lindsay and Brasier 2002; 
Gerstell and Yung 2003; Ward and Brownlee 2002). This was not known at the 
time of Carter’s 1983 article. Any such large-scale trends make CA a posteriori less 
appealing, since they induce further correlations and have their own quasi-
deterministic timescales, thus undermining the independence assumption.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematical presentation of possible relationship of two independent 
timescales. With tb we denote the median of biological timescales on different planets of 
GHZ. We may assume that PX corresponds to some measure of the extinction probability 
in the most general sense. While cases (a) and (b) correspond to the situation envisaged 
by Carter's rendition of the anthropic reasoning (in particular, case (a) is the situation 
encapsulated by CA), we argue that these situations are unjustified simplifications. 
                                                 
6 Parenthetically, this refutes the claim that we have even a single data point of quite unambiguous 
meaning. This, in our view, underlines the hubris of those who use this (uncertain) point to 
grandeloquently conclude that we are the only intelligent species in the Galaxy. 
7 However, for a view ascribing even the “Snowball” glaciations to our astrophysical environment, 
see Pavlov et al. (2005). 
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Physical reality corresponds to cases at least as complex as cases (c) and (d), where we 
have the environment monotonously becoming either more hostile or friendlier to life. In 
these cases, obviously, we have to take into account another timescale, which describes 
the rate of increase or decrease of the extinction events.  
 
 This is related to the important issue of biotic feed-back. Another 
consequence of discoveries in Earth sciences and astrobiology in the last decade 
or so is that the existence of life on Earth tends to make it more habitable both 
complexity- and time-wise. Simple lifeforms induce changes in the environment 
conductive to the appearance of more complex lifeforms, and, even more 
pertinently from the present point of view, the existence of both simple and 
complex life tends to increase the timespan of the habitable Earth beyond the 
bounds set by the Main Sequence evolution of the Sun (Lenton and von Bloh 
2001). This not only sheds some new light on the controversial Gaia hypothesis, 
but also shows that the probability of observing an inhabited planet within a 
given sample at a particular time is not a linear function of the probability of 
biogenesis, as one would naively expect (and what is assumed in CA). This does 
not represent an argument against CA yet, since the latter takes the total lifetime 
of a star on the Main Sequence as the ultimate limit on the timespan of the 
biosphere, which remains true irrespective of the feedback.8 However, it does 
much to weaken the spirit, if not the letter of CA, since it shows that probability of 
finding life at a particular place cannot be a linear function of time ceteris paribus. 
(We shall return to this point below.) 
 We do not need to emphasize that the biological timescales are still very 
poorly understood. There are some claims that the timescale of biological 
evolution on Earth is fairly typical. Russell (1983, 1995) claims that the appearance 
of intelligent beings occurs on the average about 3 Gyr after the initial stages of 
planetary formation. Much shorter timescales have been proposed: McKay argues 
that plate tectonics actually delayed the appearance of complex lifeforms on Earth, 
by keeping the level of oxygen low for a long time. According to that idea, the 
duration of the Precambrian could be as low as 108 yrs on planets without plate 
tectonics, such as Mars (McKay 1996). This would, in turn, significantly accelerate 
the emergence of sufficient complexity as a precondition for intelligence.  
 It is in this astrobiologal key that we can reiterate part of  Wilson's (1994) 
criticism of CA contained in the following passage: 
 
At first glance, the claim that te should not differ from a given value of t  
seems to be equivalent to the claim that t  should not differ from a given value 
of te. But these claims are fundamentally different. The reason the latter one is 
invalid is that t , insofar as it represents the time that evolution is intrinsically 
most likely to require, is a probabilistic or statistical quantity. Our knowledge 
of the value of such quantity cannot be significantly enhanced by the evidence 
of a single case, especially the nonrandomly chosen one of our own evolution. 
Only if we were to become aware of a large number of actual cases of 
                                                 
8 If we discard intentional action of intelligent lifeforms, which we do throughout this study, as the 
subject is still too speculative; it seems intuitively clear that advanced technological civilizations 
would be able to extend the lifetime of a biosphere significantly beyond the natural limits, using 
technologies such as stellar lifting (Criswell 1985).  
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extraterrestrial evolution and their corresponding timescales, or if we were to 
advance our knowledge of the timescales governing various evolutionary 
mechanisms, could we provide a reasonable estimate of t , and perhaps 
eliminate values of t  much less than τ0. But given only te ~ τ0, we cannot on 
the basis of this single evidential sample conclude much at all about t . We 
certainly cannot eliminate, as Carter thinks we can, the possibility that t  << τ0.  
 
 
3. Hidden uniformitarianism  
 
 Consider the different situations described in Figure 1. With obvious 
simplification, we imagine extinction probability of lifeforms as generally very 
low, except for short “spikes” which may correspond either to recurring (similar 
to mass extinction episodes in Earth’s history) or single adversary events (for 
instance, the end of stellar evolution), i.e. everything which is subsumed in 
Carter’s astrophysical timescale t*. Now, if there is a well-defined biological 
timescale, CA can be represented as choosing between the cases shown in (a) and 
(b). Clearly, CA suggests that we should accept case (a), in which the probability 
of appearance of life on an average terrestrial planet in the Galaxy is minuscule. 
However, what about cases (c) and (d)? It is clear that in these cases the governing 
timescale is the one associated with the increase or decrease in frequency of the 
extinction spikes. It follows that  
 (1) “Carter’s criterion” of the relationship between the biological and 
astrophysical timescales is time-dependent and not universal; and  
 (2) that we may need additional timescales, linked to all astrophysical 
processes which can cut or impede biological evolution.    
 The problem is that, in order to accept a picture like (c) or (d) we need to 
abandon one of the most cherished prejudices of the nineteenth and most of the 
twentieth century, which is uniformitarianism of rate (or gradualism). It is not 
only that the habitability of an astrobiological site is not constant in time, but the 
frequency of important events (“extinction spikes”) is changing with the 
evolution of the Galactic system. We shall argue below that the situation shown in 
Fig. 1.d is the best model for astrobiology and that in such framework CA fails. As 
we have said, there are a host of recent indications that the Solar System is in fact 
an open system, strongly interacting with its Galactic environment (e.g., Rampino 
and Stothers 1985; Rampino 1997; Leitch and Vasisht 1998; Shaviv 2002; Melott et 
al. 2004; Pavlov et al. 2005; Gies and Helsel 2005). Interactions induce correlations; 
correlations ruin arguments based on independence assumptions and 
coincidences. Why is that simple fact so widely shunned in favor of a prejudice 
representing essentially a return to the outdated nineteenth-century Lyellian 
gradualism? 
 Barrow and Tipler (1986) succintly state this critical uniformitarian 
assumption for which we need a specific label:  
 
 THESIS (*): “the probability of intelligence increases monotonically 
 with time” (p. 559, our emphasis) 
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We deny this assumption, for reasons to be discussed below. It is important to 
understand that (*) is the central plank of CA—with it gone, the whole edifice 
crumbles.  
 First, (*) encapsulates an anthropocentrism unwarranted even in the 
simplest local case of the biological evolution on Earth. It is by no mean clear (and 
many evolutionary biologists have denied it) that the history of the terrestrial 
biosphere represents anything even remotely describable as “monotonical” 
approach to intelligence. Even if we take the most merciful interpretation of 
“monotonically”, which allows for the ever-present paleontological stasis, there is 
simply no indication in the history of life that intelligence is inherently more 
probable today than, say, in the middle of the Cretaceous or in 108 years from 
now. (Quite contrary to the seeming intention of Barrow and Tipler, it is anthropic 
reasoning which tells us that we should not invoke our presence to argue for the 
thesis (*)—it is trivial observation that our discussing the subject matter shows 
that intelligence exists now, while it does not tell us anything about its intrinsic 
probability. Moreover, the same fact suggests that the intelligence posing these 
questions is not very old, at least compared to geological or astrophysical 
timescales, since it is hardly conceivable that any significantly older intelligent 
species would not have much better insight into the nature of intelligence. 
Anthropic reasoning, when properly applied, is not just disteleological, but 
actively anti-teleological; see, e.g. Bostrom 2002.) 
 Second, the problem is not that the probability of intelligence increases 
with time ceteris paribus. It is quite clear that the probability of observing any 
particular physically possible phenomenon at least once increases with cosmic 
time; the very statistical nature of our world ensures that. Of course, we need to 
take into account our cosmological knowledge: if the lifetime of our universe is 
finite – as was believed in now mostly discredited recollapsing “Big Crunch” 
models – then most physically allowed configurations of matter will simply have 
no time to arise accidentally due to statistical fluctuations. Contrariwise, if the 
time is infinite and the world is finite and stationary on large scales (as was 
commonly thought in the time of Boltzmann, say), than any configuration of 
matter in accordance with the general conservation laws will be achieved 
countless times, no matter how a priori improbable.9 
But this is entirely different from the claim that we have a monotonic 
“ascent” towards intelligence under very specific (and in the cosmological context 
very atypical) conditions required for biogenesis and biological evolution. Such a 
monotonic approach entails some specific causal reason, since both the spatial and 
temporal timescales we are considering here are many hundreds of orders of 
magnitude smaller than those required for the random assembly of even the 
simplest living systems. However, such a causative agent has not been found, and 
is most likely to join the outdated (vitalism) and/or compromised new-age 
                                                 
9 On exactly such grounds Boltzmann and his assistant Shuetz argued that the present low-
entropy state of the universe is just a fluctuation within a much larger reality which is perpetually 
in the state of heat death. This picture is now, of course, outdated, but can be given a modern 
reformulation; see Ćirković (2003). 
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notions (morphogenetic field).10 In Stephen Jay Gould’s (1984) words: “the failure 
to find a clear ‘vector of progress' in life’s history... [is] the most puzzling fact of 
the fossil record.” And if that is true for a single, by astrobiological measure, 
physically stable and uniform terrestrial biosphere, we have grounds for 
accepting it a fortiori for the set of (actual or potential) biospheres comprising 
GHZ. 
  
 
 
Figure 2. Is mean really the message? It is a notorious truism that the timescale of 
measurement dictates the amount of information we can get about evolving phenomena: 
the longer our measurement lasts, the less useful information we get due to averaging 
inherent in any measurement. In the context of CA we can regard noogenesis as an 
extremely slow type of “measurement”: thus, it is likely that the physical conditions all 
over GHZ vary substantially on shorter timescales, which precludes getting information 
on the basis of a single astrophysical timescale. 
 
 Therefore, the thesis (*) represents a particularly illuminating example of 
what biologists came to call a chain-of-being fallacy: the quasi-Victorian idea that 
the history of biosphere is a steady, linear progression through more and more 
complex forms culminating in a whiskey-sipping, golf-playing, white-clad and 
well-armed gentlemen (occassionally subjugating uncouth barbarians overseas). 
As shown by Gould in the very first chapter of Wonderful Life, this iconography 
has been conventionally employed in support of various scientifically wrong, but 
socially comforting, ideological social issues (Gould 1989). Although fierce 
debates on the issue of “progress”—or large-scale evolutionary trends in 
general—continue to this day (e.g., Dawkins 1989; Dennett 1995; Gould 1996, 
2002; Shanahan 1999, 2001; Knoll and Bambach 2000; Carroll 2001; Conway 
Morris 1998, 2003), both sides do agree that the chain-of-being picture is 
untenable. No serious biologist will today defend the idea that humankind is the 
pre-determined pinnacle of Nature. (Sadly, this realignement has not been 
                                                 
10 This indeterminism should not be confused with the erroneous view that biological (or at least 
Darwinian) evolution proceeds randomly in the metaphysical sense. The (in)famous “Boeing 747” 
argument of Sir Fred Hoyle has been often cited and misused by creationists and other pseudo-
scientists as the “proof” of intelligent design or some similar ideologically concocted scheme. 
Fortunately enough, the argument is demonstrably wrong; it has been refuted many times, 
notably by Dawkins (1989) and Dennett (1995).   
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followed by the popular press, especially the part with its own ideological axe to 
grind.) Thus, (*) is ideologically loaded: it supports the idea that intelligence is 
fundamentally different from other biological traits, and that the bearers of 
intelligence are entitled to higher and more important place in the natural order 
of things.  
 Ironically, distinguished biologists who have opposed SETI like Mayr and 
Simpson, devoted a large part of their professional careers to debunking the 
chain-of-being fallacy! Notably, the adaptationist paradigm of which Mayr is one 
of founding fathers, even hesitates to ascribe any particular importance to 
intelligence, or to proclaim it different from any other trait in nature. Within the 
framework of adaptationism, there is no a priori difference between intelligence 
and, say, the spiral form of the shell of Nautilus. Now, just imagine rephrasing (*) 
in the following form: 
 
 THESIS (*''): “the probability of a spiral shell with a pitch angle between 
 23° and 25° increases monotonically with time”. 
 
In our view, (*'') is almost obvious nonsense; why should we then—if we discard 
sentimentality, anthropocentrism and possible extrascientific agendas—give 
better treatment to (*)? If, to use Stephen Jay Gould’s famous metaphor, “the tape 
was rewound” to the time of the Cambrian Explosion, it would be highly unlikely 
for humans to re-appear after sufficient time has elapsed (Gould 1989). Gould 
forcefully argued in several books and papers (Gould 1985, 1987, 1989, 1996), that 
the very notion of “progress” of the terrestrial biosphere is highly suspicious, 
culture-laden and with very slim empirical support (if at all). How much more 
pretentious and vacuous does it sound when applied to the immense diversity 
that other Galactic environments may present! If the thesis (*) is an interpretation 
of “progress” or “ascent”, the same classical criticisms apply.  
McKay (1996) playfully suggests that dinosaurs could in fact have 
developed not only intelligence, but spacefaring civilization as well, without our 
noticing it at present! Strong erosion, following the giant impact, in the course of 
65 Myr could easily obliterate all traces of such a predilluvian culture. Similarly, if 
humans were to go extinct soon (perhaps as a result of runaway climatic 
catastrophe, nuclear winter or a misuse of biotechnology or nanotechnology11), in 
a few million years all traces of human civilization would have been obliterated 
(except for the satellites in stable orbits and a couple of long-range space probes). 
Would the next intelligent species, if it ever arises subsequently, have the same 
cultural predilection for (*) as we have?  
Now, if we conclude that (*) is unjustified for the simplest local model of 
biological evolution on a single planet, how likely is that (*) will apply to a large 
set of habitable planets comprising GHZ? Even if the planets were isolated, 
“closed-box” idealizations—which is unrealistic—the uniform behavior implied 
by (*) is as probable as sudden motion of molecules of homogeneous air in a room 
into a 1 m3 volume in a corner. As Boltzmann, Zermelo, Culverwell, and others 
                                                 
11 An option pertinent for obvious reasons—and very relevant for contemporary astrobiologists 
(e.g., Bostrom and Ćirković 2007). 
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already knew in the nineteenth century, such conspiratorial behavior is highly 
unlikely on statistical grounds without going into detailed physics of 
thermodynamical systems (e.g., Steckline 1983). Per analogiam, without knowing 
any details on particular astrobiological development in each habitat, we might 
argue that uniformity of evolution expressed by (*) is improbable. Of course, our 
discussion here and elsewhere pertains only to the evolution of hypothetical 
biospheres comprising GHZ, which are of interest to SETI studies; if we take into 
account other galaxies, clusters, etc. the situation may be both quantitatively and 
qualitatively different.  
 When we reject hidden uniformitarianism even the tb << t* case of Carter's 
dilemma is not to be rejected so lightly. An obvious counterexample in this 
respect is the much-debated “impact frustration” of early lifeforms (Raup and 
Valentine 1983; Maher and Stevenson 1988; Oberbeck and Fogleman 1989). It is 
entirely conceivable that early terrestrial life appeared independently several 
times, only to be destroyed by catastrophic impacts during the epoch of the so-
called late heavy bombardment. Only when the frequency of impacts decreased 
sufficiently (perhaps after the end of the late-heavy bombardment), were early 
lifeforms capable of spreading, diversifying and evolving in order to produce the 
subsequent rich and complex terrestrial biosphere. If this was so, 
' 7 8
*10 10 yrbt t−? ?  where with 'bt  we denote the timescale for biogenesis; while 
we cannot still infer anything about “true” bt  (i.e. the noogenesis timescale), if for 
any reason there were an upper limit to 'bt  (related perhaps to the chemical 
evolution of Earth’s atmosphere or surface and the increase of Solar radiation 
flux), it could be perfectly conceivable that life could “miss the last train” due to 
the impact interruptions. This scenario is highly instructive, since it shows (A) 
strong coupling between lifeforms and physical environment, and (B) timescale 
forcing, through which a physical timescale (the interval between major impacts) 
actually becomes the only relevant quantity. While we cannot treat this topic in 
detail here, this example of a new development in astrobiology bolsters the 
conclusion that uniformitarianism and continuous habitability of a planet are just 
convenient and oversimplifying myths. 
 
 
4. A plausible alternative: global extinction mechanisms 
 
If we accept that CA is at least severely limited by the non-uniformitarian history 
of life it is natural to ask for more details about the major non-uniformities which 
impede its “monotonic” progress.12 Fortunately, modern astrophysical research 
offers much in this respect. An important paper of Annis (1999) opened a new 
vista by introducing (though not quite explicitly) the notion of a global regulation 
mechanism, that is, a dynamical process preventing or impeding uniform 
                                                 
12 We do not presume any special understanding of evolutionary biology here; the formulation is 
applicable to a case of stable, only very slowly changing biological environment—a single 
macroevolutionary regime in terms of Jablonski (1986, 1989)—in which Barrow and Tipler's 
metaphor of “monotonic approach to intelligence” might perhaps work. Such world is not the real 
world, but its juxtaposition with the real world can teach us some important lessons.  
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emergence and development of life all over the Galaxy.13 In Annis' model, which 
he dubbed the phase-transition model for reasons to be explained shortly, the role 
of such global Galactic regulation is played by gamma-ray bursts (henceforth 
GRBs14), collosal explosions caused either by terminal collapse of supermassive 
objects (“hypernovae”) or mergers of binary neutron stars. GRBs observed since 
the 1950s have been known for more than a decade to be of cosmological origin. 
Astrobiological and ecological consequences of GRBs and related phenomena 
have been investigated recently in several studies (Thorsett 1995; Dar 1997; Scalo 
and Wheeler 2002; Thomas et al. 2005). To give just a flavor of the results, let us 
mention that Dar (1997) has calculated that the terminal collapse of the famous 
supermassive object Eta Carinae could deposit in the upper atmosphere of Earth 
energy equivalent to the simultaneous explosions of 1 kiloton nuclear bomb per 
km2 all over the hemisphere facing the hypernova! According to the calculations 
of Scalo and Wheeler (2002), a Galactic GRB can be lethal for eukaryotes up to the 
huge distance of 14 kpc. Thus, this “zone of lethality”  for advanced lifeforms is 
bound to comprise the entire GHZ whenever a GRB occurs within the inner 10 
kpc of the Galaxy. Annis suggested that GRBs could cause mass extinctions of life 
all over the Galaxy (or GHZ), preventing or arresting the emergence of complex 
life forms. Thus, there is only a very small probability that a particular planetary 
biosphere could evolve intelligent beings in our past. However, since the 
regulation mechanism exhibits secular evolution, with the rate of catastrophic 
events decreasing with time, at some point the astrobiological evolution of the 
Galaxy will experience a change of regime. When the rate of catastrophic events is 
high, there is a sort of quasi-equilibrium state between the natural tendency of life 
to spread, diversify, and complexify, and the rate of destruction and extinctions. 
When the rate becomes lower than some threshold value, intelligent and space-
faring species can arise in the interval between the two extinctions and make 
themselves immune (presumably through technological means) to further 
extinctions.  
 It is important to understand that the GRB-mechanism is just one of several 
possible physical processes for “resetting astrobiological clocks”. Any 
catastrophic mechanism operating (1) on sufficiently large scales, and (2) 
exhibiting secular evolution can play a similar role. There is no dearth of such 
mechanisms; some of the bolder ideas proposed in the literature are cometary 
impact-causing “Galactic tides” (Asher et al. 1994; Rampino 1997), neutrino 
irradiation (Collar 1996), clumpy cold dark matter (Abbas and Abbas 1998), or 
climate changes induced by spiral-arm crossings (Leitch and Vasisht 1998; Shaviv 
2002). Moreover, all these effects are cumulative: the total risk function of the global 
regulation is the sum of all risk functions of individual catastrophic mechanisms. The 
secular evolution of all these determine collectively whether and when conditions 
for the astrobiological phase transition of the Galaxy will be satisfied. Of course, if 
                                                 
13 A similar suggestion has been made earlier by Clarke (1981), although his model was entirely 
qualitative and used wrong physical mechanism (Galactic core outbursts) for global regulation; 
see also Clube (1978), LaViolette (1987).  
14 The literature on GRB physics is voluminous; some of the best review articles are Piran (2000), 
Dar and De Rújula (2004). 
 15 
GRBs are the most important physical mechanism of extinction, as Annis 
suggested, then their distribution function will dominate the global risk function 
and force the phase transition. 
One should also note that there is another sort of global regulation 
mechanism which we shall not discuss here, but which features prominently in 
the SETI-related discourse: an intentional global regulation imposed by 
whichever intelligent community first achieves Kardashev's Type III status 
(utilizing resources on the pan-Galactic basis). This is the astrobiological 
background of scenarios such as the “Zoo hypothesis” (Ball 1973) or the “Interdict 
hypothesis” (Fogg 1987). The same regulatory effect could be achieved without 
directly controlling the Galactic resources by releasing destructive von Neumann 
probes (see the disturbing comments on this scenario in the classical review of 
Brin 1983). It is very difficult to assess the real value of such scenarios while 
lacking deeper theoretical ideas about the capacity of advanced technological 
civilizations (possibly postbiological in nature; see Dick 2003; Ćirković and 
Bradbury 2006). It seems reasonable to assume a gradual switch of regimes from 
natural to artificial astrobiological regulation. All these ideas present special cases 
of the general global regulation hypothesis, but are too speculative to be seriously 
considered at present.  
GRB regulation has an important correlation property: the rhythm of 
biological extinctions should be synchronized (up to the timescales of transport 
times ~104 yrs for γ-rays and high-energy cosmic rays) in at least part of the 
histories of all potentially habitable planets. In fact, a bold hypothesis has been 
put forward recently by Melott et al. (2004) that a known terrestrial mass 
extinction episode, one of the “Big Five” (the late-Ordovician extinction, cca. 440 
Myr before present), corresponds to a Galactic GRB event.  
 It is intuitively clear that such correlated behavior undermines Carter's 
argument. With a set of modest additional assumptions it is possible to show it 
quantitatively. For instance, in Figure 3 we show results of toy numerical 
experiments performed in order to see how timescale forcing arises in simplified 
evolving systems. This presents a simple realization of the astrobiological 
regulation model of Annis (1999).  GRBs are taken to be random events occuring 
with exponentially decreasing frequency 
 
 ( ) 0 exp ,tt tγν ν
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
with the fixed characteristic timescale 5tγ = Gyr in accordance with the 
cosmological observations (e.g., Bromm and Loeb 2002), and biological timescales 
for noogenesis are randomly sampled from a log-uniform distribution between 
108 (the minimum suggested by McKay 1996) and 1016 yrs (the total lifetime of the 
Galaxy as a well defined entity; Adams & Laughlin 1997). For simplicity it has 
been assumed that the age of the Galaxy is exactly 12 Gyr and that all planets are 
of the same age. It is taken that the chain of events leading to life and intelligence 
can be cut by a catastrophic event at any planet in our toy-model Galaxy with 
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probability Q, and its astrobiological clock reset. The toy model counts only 
planets achieving noogenesis at least once and it does not take into account any 
subsequent destructive processes, either natural or intelligence-caused (like nuclear 
or biotech self-destruction). Probability Q can, in the first approximation, be 
regarded as a geometrical probability of an average habitable planet being in the 
“lethal zone” of a GRB, and more complex effects dealing with the physics and 
ecology of the extinction mechanism can be subsumed in it.  
 While we shall present more detailed analysis and interpretation of these 
and similar numerical experiments in a forthcoming work (Vukotić and Ćirković 
2007), some conclusions invariably support our criticism of CA and are worth 
mentioning here. The system exhibits a systematic shift of behavior as we move 
from small values of Q (gradualism) to large values (catastrophism). At large Q, 
we have a step-like succession of astrobiological regimes, governed by external 
timescale forcing. In each regime, it is obvious that the ages of inhabited planets 
are not independent and uncorrelated, just the contrary, as we expected from the 
considerations above.    
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Figure 3. Results of a simple Monte Carlo simulation demonstrating timescale forcing in 
the toy model of a galaxy with N = 106 habitable planets. Three cases of different average 
extinction probability Q are given (with 5 color-coded runs for each case), where small Q 
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represents an approximation to the classical uniformitarian case, while Q → 1  
corresponds to catastrophe-driven evolution.  
 
In other words, neocatastrophism removes, ironically enough, the basic tacit 
assumption of CA. If the agents of extinction are correlated over the spatial scale 
of GHZ, timescale forcing undermines Carter's reasoning in a natural way. As 
Heraclitus fancied 25 centuries ago, (astrophysical) thunderbolt may indeed steer 
all things (astrobiological).  
 (It is important to emphasize that in the simulation above we have 
neglected all sources of correlations between the life-bearing sites barring the GRB 
regulation. Some processes – like panspermia, either natural or directed – 
certainly deserve to be taken into account, and we shall discuss them in detail in a 
forthcoming study. However, all these processes will only strengthen the 
correlations and thus decrease our confidence in Carter's reasoning.)  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 We conclude that it is too early to draw sceptical conclusions about the 
abundance of extraterrestrial life and intelligence from our single data point via 
the “anthropic” argument of Carter (1983). In addition to other deficiencies of the 
argument pointed out in the literature, we emphasize that a picture in which 
regulation mechanisms reset local astrobiological clocks (which, consequently, 
tick rather unevenly) offers a way to reconcile our astrophysical knowledge with 
the idea of multiple habitats of life and intelligence in the Galaxy. In other words, 
Earth may be rare in time, not in space! Quite contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
we should not be surprised if we encounter many “Earths” throughout the 
Galaxy at this particular moment in time, at stages of evolution of their biospheres 
similar to the one reached at Earth. The unsupported assumption of gradualism is 
identified as the main source of confusion and unwarranted SETI skepticism (for 
a related discussion in the practical context of the Drake equation see Ćirković 
2004b). This pertains to the Milky Way galaxy, where communication times are 
short enough to make the entire effort worthwhile (and to bring other factors, 
such as Fermi’s paradox, into play). If we take into account progressively larger 
ensembles it will be possible sooner or later to find the monotonic behaviour 
criticized above, but this is largely formal and irrelevant for practical SETI. 
 The astrobiological picture presented here can be understood by means of 
loose analogy with the much-discussed theory of punctuated equilibrium in 
evolutionary biology. Seeking to explain the evident stop-start nature of the fossil 
record Eldredge and Gould (1972) proposed the theory of punctuated equilibria 
(for the detailed elaboration and synthetic view see Gould 2002). According to 
this theory, species tend to remain stable for long periods of time (“stasis”). The 
equilibrium is punctuated by abrupt changes in which existing species are 
suddenly (on geological timescale) replaced. The astrobiological analogy of 
paleontological stasis can be found in Fig. 3c, where we perceive long periods (of 
~ 1 Gyr duration) with the same number of inhabited planets before a sudden 
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change. This feature is in itself antithetical to the spirit of CA; as emphasized by 
Gould (1989): 
 
Hence, a good deal more than half the history of life is a story of prokaryotic cells 
alone, and only the last one-sixth of life's time on earth has included multicellular 
animals. Such delays and long lead times strongly suggest contingency and a vast 
realm of unrealized possibilities. If prokaryotes had to advance toward eukaryotic 
complexity, they certainly took their time about it.  
 
This is directly opposite to the thesis (*) and its monotonic ascent toward a 
(perceived) noble goal.  
 This is intimately linked to the issue of existence or otherwise of a well-
defined biological timescale, universal for all habitable planets in the Milky Way. 
Obviously, in order to discuss this issue we have first to establish to which degree 
observed timescales on Earth (the one for appearance of life, or the one for rise of 
complex metazoans, or the one for emergence of intelligent species) are a 
consequence of deterministic or just contingent processes, and how big a role 
chance has played in their values (Carroll 2001). Gould's “paradox of the first tier” 
points in the same direction: “...mass extinctions are sufficiently frequent, intense, 
and different in impact to undo and reset any pattern that might accumulate 
during normal times.” (Gould 1985) Here we add another aspect to this 
“enlightened” view of catastrophes: not only do they provide the pump of 
evolution by enabling innovative overthrows of entire faunas, but – in the 
astrobiological context – they could provide us with correlations on the basis of 
which we could meaningfully consider astrobiological evolution of the Galaxy; 
indirectly, they offer weak support for our current and future SETI efforts. 
This undermining of Carter’s argument is entirely in accordance with the 
well-known tendency in the history of science and the human culture in general: 
overcoming of the sense of privilege surrounding the Solar System, Earth, 
terrestrial life, and humanity. This “Copernican” tendency comes as a consequence 
of the astrophysical discourse, not as a sacred dogma to be preserved at all costs. 
Furthermore, a natural generalization of the history of the terrestrial biosphere to 
the case of the Milky Way from the astrobiological point of view entails the 
acceptance of a sort of Galactic (neo)catastrophism (or a Galactic punctuated 
equilibrium!). It immediately undermines CA, since there is no fixed, unique, 
reified timescale in the core of the argument.  
There are several reasons of a partly non-scientific nature for the strong 
impression CA leaves in many quarters. As we have seen, it is tempting to 
subsume all complicated astrophysics and planetary science into a single 
timescale, although this degree of simplification is, in fact, unwarranted; this 
applies to biology even more forcefully. There is an unfortunate tendency in the 
philosophy of science to downplay radical scientific theories and underestimate 
our present level of understanding; sometimes it is motivated by healthy reasons 
of skepticism, but often—the case of Mach’s fierce “philosophical” opposition to 
Boltzmann’s atomism comes to mind—it actually represents a conservative 
backlash, impeding recognition of new ideas. In addition, the textbook account of 
the defeat of catastrophism and the misleading philosophical legacy imparted to it 
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in the mid-nineteenth century lead all too often to half-conscious neglect of any 
temporal markers in investigation of natural phenomena other than the beginning 
and the end. Finally, CA offers an emotionally satisfying, but nevertheless false 
sense of “strength in numbers”.  
 A particularly dangerous form of “quick and dirty” generalization is 
embodied in the thesis (*) of monotonical ascent toward intelligence criticized 
above. Naive chain-of-being anthropocentrism (or intelligence-centrism) 
surrounding the reasoning of CA-proponents is starkly manifested here. In our 
view, neither is there a physical basis (uniformitarianism of environmental 
conditions) for it, nor there is clear biological justification (since the adaptive value 
of intelligence is still an unknown quantity). Thus, CA represents more wishful 
thinking coupled with intellectual inertia when faced with abandoning 
gradualism and the closed-box assumption, than a serious scientific argument.  
The tremendous progress in astrobiology (e.g. Chyba and Hand 2005) 
clearly demonstrates that the oversimplifications inherent in CA are no longer 
tenable. To retain them means to reject all we have achieved in the last couple of 
decades on establishing concrete physical and chemical conditions for emergence 
of life in the cosmic context. If CA is largely, as Carter himself admitted, an 
argument from ignorance, then any decrease in our ignorance ought to prompt its 
reassessment and reevaluation. We are fortunate enough to live in this exciting 
epoch of truly wonderful results in this field, from cosmology and orbital 
observatories down to biochemical labs and paleontology museums. That it is also 
the epoch in which CA can be effectively undermined is by no means a 
coincidence. 
All in all, we have no a priori (or even anthropic-based) reason to reject the 
existence of extraterrestrial intelligence in the Milky Way. Geocentrism stays 
defeated and the road for serious SETI studies is as open as ever. 
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